Is the population issue a matter of survival?

Should the changes in Turkey's demographic structure, the decline in the total fertility rate, and the increase in the elderly population be seen as a source of concern as is claimed?

Are changes in population structure truly a matter of survival for our country? Or, contrary to claims, are changes in our population a positive development?

Could the measures envisaged to increase fertility not be beneficial, but on the contrary, lead to some consequences that could be harmful for our country?

The Population Policies Booklet prepared by the Public Health Specialists Association, HASUDER, and the Health and Social Assistance Foundation, SSYV, begins with these questions.

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The first census of the Republic was conducted in 1927. The total population was calculated at 13,648,270. It was impossible to establish a modern country with such a population, overwhelmingly living in rural areas and decimated by various epidemics. Therefore, during the early Republican period, a pronatalist policy was adopted to increase the population and encourage childbirth.

Despite the intervening years of World War II, the pronatalist policy was successful, and by 1965 the population exceeded 31 million.

This time, it became clear that economic and social development would be impossible with the current population growth rate, and, unlike the previous era, an antinatalist policy was adopted to reduce population growth. This policy resulted in the legalization of previously prohibited birth control methods and abortion with certain restrictions, and the authorization of non-physician healthcare personnel to administer intrauterine devices (IUDs).

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Censuses used to be conducted by visiting each house individually; now, they are based on address-based records. According to the latest 2024 census, our population has reached 85,664,994.

On the other hand, the total fertility rate, which represents the average number of children born to women in a country between the ages of 15 and 49, is still slightly above the European Union average but has been declining steadily for years.

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The Islamist AKP, which has governed the country for over twenty years, has seen this situation and has once again shifted to anti-natalist policies. Indeed, the Population Policies Board, established last year, defined its primary mission as "to comprehensively examine the factors causing the decline in the fertility rate and their consequences, and to take the necessary measures."

During the AKP era, attempts were made to increase the fertility rate through measures such as de facto prohibition of abortion, financial support for those getting married, and child allowances.

So, are the AKP's policies aimed at increasing the population growth rate successful?

The population growth rate, which was 12.1 per thousand in 2002, when the AKP took over power, dropped to 5.1 per thousand in 2024. In the same years, the total fertility rate also decreased from 2.17 to 1.45.

Because as urbanization increases, both the age of marriage and the age at first pregnancy rise. Women's higher education levels and higher rates of participation in the workforce also encourage fewer children. Furthermore, the economic crisis also forces fewer children.

Ultimately, urban families with few children have become the norm and it seems impossible to reverse them.

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Let's come to the claim that "The population issue is turning into a matter of survival."

In TÜİK's population projections, Türkiye's population in 2100 is projected to be 54.2 million in the low scenario, 100.6 million in the high scenario, and 76.8 million in the main scenario.

As can be seen, there is no such thing as Anatolia becoming depopulated.

The main claim is that as the elderly population increases, the dependent population rate will also increase and the working population will not be able to care for the dependent population, provide for their livelihood, in short, sustain their lives.

In Türkiye, the population over the age of 65, which was 6.7 per thousand in 2000, increased to 10.6 per thousand in 2024, and the dependency ratio of this population on the working population aged 15-64 increased from 10.5 percent to 15.5 percent.

When looked at this way, it seems we are facing an unsustainable situation in the future.

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However, the dependent population ratio, which represents the ratio of the population that consumes what workers produce—that is, the population assumed to be unproductive—to the total population, doesn't just consist of the elderly. It also includes children aged 0-14.

When we look at that, the situation is exactly the opposite. The child population ratio decreased from 29.3 percent to 20.9 percent between 2000 and 2024, and the child dependency ratio decreased from 45.7 percent to 30.6 percent in the same years.

Scientific predictions indicate that the percentage of the working population will remain unchanged despite declining birth rates. The proportion of elderly people in the dependent population will increase, while the proportion of children will decrease, but the dependent population appears to remain relatively stable.

Meanwhile, two more factors need to be taken into consideration when making projections on this issue.

First, due to the economic crisis and low pensions, the proportion of the workforce over 65 in Türkiye is steadily increasing. Second, the unemployed population remains widespread, especially among women.

In other words, Türkiye does not seem to have a labor shortage issue or a survival issue stemming from the population problem in the coming decades.

Türkiye's biggest problem is its conflict with political Islamists, who have been plaguing the country for over twenty years.