Ruşen Çakır wrote: Öcalan needs Demirtaş, Demirtaş needs Öcalan, the process needs both

"A Türkiye without terrorism," the "peace process," or the "new peace process"—whichever name you prefer, the "process" we're talking about has disappeared from the country's agenda. There are many reasons for this.

First of all, the political power has not given up on its efforts to manipulate the CHP through the judiciary, pressing the accelerator to the limit instead of the brakes. The appointment of a member of the Istanbul CHP on September 2nd has become a new "interim peak" in this regard, as have the operation against the Bayrampaşa Municipality yesterday and the potential consequences of tomorrow's CHP Congress Trial. Had the CHP remained silent and resentful of its fate, the situation might have changed. But since March 19th, the CHP, under the leadership of Özgür Özel, has not given up, responding to the judiciary's actions both by attempting to engage the judiciary and, more importantly, by expanding the political arena.

The second reason is that we haven't witnessed any concrete action since a group of PKK militants lit a fire on July 11th. So much so that MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, "unable to resist," gave an interview to the AKP's leading publication, Sabah Newspaper. He declared, "Peace is not a one-winged bird," and, without mentioning their names, demanded that Erdoğan return the mayoralties to Ahmet Türk and Ahmet Özer.

The cancellation of trustees appointed to municipalities is a long-awaited step. Indeed, months ago, Erdoğan said, "Trustees will be an exception," but he failed to fulfill this promise, which required no legal regulation. It appears Bahçeli's call will be answered in the coming days. This is evident from the fact that Şişli's CHP mayor, Resul Emrah Şahan, who was replaced by a trustee due to the "city consensus," was hastily investigated for corruption, and a second arrest warrant was issued for him.

Another step that "does not require legal regulation" is the release of the Kobani Trial detainees, particularly Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, Osman Kavala and other Gezi Park protest detainees, and the confirmation of Can Atalay's parliamentary seat. It appears Erdoğan does not want these and is trying to delay them as much as possible.

All that remains is the National Solidarity, Brotherhood, and Democracy Commission in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. But little remains of the excitement the Commission generated in its early days. There was a week's recess, and last week, unions and professional organizations were heard, and we heard nothing memorable.

Of course, the situation will change considerably if a delegation of 4-5 people from the commission, which will be formed upon the proposal of the MHP, meets with Abdullah Öcalan.

But when we talk about Öcalan, we need to pause and reflect. The PKK's "founding leader"'s invitation and persuasion to lay down his arms and dissolve the organization were, of course, critical steps; there was nothing anyone else could have done but him. It's inevitable that the major transformation required for the Kurdish political movement to organize fully in a legal arena in the coming period will also be experienced under his leadership.

But there is a very serious problem: While Öcalan's being one of the main actors in the process is crucial in convincing the majority of Kurdish public opinion, it also creates just as many, if not more, problems for non-Kurdish public opinion.

For example, numerous public opinion polls have been conducted recently regarding the process, and they reveal that while more than half of the public wants a solution, more than half don't believe it will happen. This disbelief stems from a lack of mutual trust. For example, the non-Kurdish public distrusts Öcalan and the PKK, whom they have long viewed as "baby killers" and "separatist leaders." Indeed, when one polling company added Öcalan's name to a question about the process, the percentage of those who want a solution dropped dramatically.

The most serious handicap currently facing the process is the lack of widespread and strong public support. Erdoğan's reluctance and refusal to activate the consent-generating mechanisms under his control play a key role in this. Conversely, Bahçeli, who has much less resources than Erdoğan, is making significant strides in addressing not only the Turkish but also the Kurdish public opinion, addressing mutual distrust.

In this context, for the sake of the process, we need Kurdish politicians/leaders who can speak to the "other" public, on par with Bahçeli. It's hard to say the DEM Party offers much hope on this point. In our meetings with him, there are indications that Öcalan is willing to undertake such a mission, and such a move would be a strategic mistake.

That leaves Selahattin Demirtaş as the best option. A Demirtaş who will be freed soon, with Öcalan's knowledge, approval, and oversight, will be crucial in legitimizing this process throughout Türkiye.

I know this isn't easy, but it's not impossible either. I suspect Demirtaş would also be willing to take on such a task/responsibility. If he can accomplish this in a way that doesn't threaten Öcalan's leadership, he will largely overcome any potential problems.

I also think that Öcalan knows that he needs Demirtaş to realize the new Kurdish political movement he envisions and is trying to lay the groundwork for this.