Mehmet Tatlı wrote | Conceptual cleansing in the peace process: What is not democratization?

The discourse of “ This regime has no chance of democratization ”, which has recently increased especially in the independent media against those who support the peace process, can be defined as not only a political positioning but also an expression of traumas engraved in political memory, broken expectations and repressed anger.

Therefore, this objection feeds not only on content but also on emotion. Therefore, the response to this discourse must be developed not only with rational arguments but also with a depth that will grasp the psychopolitical ground .

Like the saying, “There is no democracy with this regime,” any analysis that excludes potential absolutizes the existing; it considers the dominant fixed and the powerful invincible . What we call historical transformation is precisely the infiltration of potential into reality – often at an unexpected moment.

Peace is not just a negotiation table; it is a whole of discussions where sovereignty, legitimacy and the imagination of society will be re-established. At this point, tying politics solely to the intention of the state not only renders society passive, but also underestimates the power of the collective will to construct.

What we have today is the possibility, however incomplete and fragile, of writing the first letters of a new social contract. And perhaps the most political act is to defend what is not yet there, but what is possible.

When we look at the essence of the criticisms we have reached, most of them code democratization as a linear, top-down and centralized “reform process.” However, history and modern political thought as a discipline teach us the following: democratization is not an outcome, but a process built through struggle. Moreover, democratic initiatives often leak not from “democratic” regimes, but from authoritarian regimes struggling with their own internal contradictions …

Imagining democratization as a series of reforms operating from top to bottom is one of the most important ideological weapons of modern authoritarianism. Yet, history has shown us that most of the time, it is not democratic regimes but crises that give birth to democracy. The Portuguese Revolution of 1974, the Latin American transitions of the 1980s or the example of South Africa were constructed with the potential for transformation that seeped through authoritarianism .

This equation is also valid for Turkey: the weakening of the current regime’s means of strengthening itself can only be thwarted by the will of the “powerless.” Therefore, the fundamental question today is not whether the regime is democratic or not, but which existing forms of sovereignty can be eroded by peace.

In this context, the main issue is not whether the AKP is democratic or not, but what hegemonic crises the resolution of the conflict could trigger. The current peace process could pave the way for social ruptures that carry democratic potential, regardless of the character of the regime.

Peace is not only the absence of conflict; it is also a moment in which sovereignty is redefined . The most important tool that has kept the AKP on its feet so far is “security consolidation.” Therefore, the peace process can dissolve the internal consistency of the regime by rendering this tool dysfunctional.

In this respect, peace is not just “dialogue” but a hegemonic struggle area. It is not just “stopping the conflict” but redefining how the state sees society. It is not just “demanding” but constructing oneself as a founding subject.

No peace process ever ends as it initially promised. But it doesn’t stay where it started. It changes actors, breaks down categories, produces new political subjectivities. Peace functions as a kind of social laboratory. But despite the setbacks, at least three outcomes are sure to happen:

• The area of ​​civil politics expands: Because war is not waged only with bullets, but also with the power to set the agenda. In peace, the agenda diversifies.

• Clique conflicts within the state become visible: The state, which is presented as a “whole” during the conflict phase, is actually full of internal contradictions. Peace exposes these contradictions more easily.

• The area of ​​social mobilization expands: Different voices become more visible on the streets, in parliament, in the media. Dominant discourses and methods are forced to erode in this diversity.

Therefore, peace itself is not an outcome but rather acts as an engine of democratic transformation .

Objections to peace arise from different segments of society, each based on its own historical position, memory and political intuition. Therefore, peace needs to be redefined not only among political actors but also with different segments of society.

For example, left-wing socialist circles tend to see the peace process as a tactic that legitimizes the government’s authoritarianism . However, this perspective itself is currently open to debate. Because one of the most important foundations of authoritarianism is the current nationalist legitimacy mechanism that relies on war and security discourse. The influence of the nationalist paradigm is still decisive in the impoverished classes’ inability to achieve a direction-setting power in politics in Turkey. To the extent that peace dries up these militaristic veins, it can create an opportunity for an environment where social inequalities, especially class struggle, can be discussed more openly.

Kemalist-nationalist circles, on the other hand, ignore the opportunity for the most fundamental principle of the Republic, “Peace at home, peace in the world”, to regain meaning through the peace process. With a solution to the Kurdish issue, Turkey will establish its national unity not just on paper but in real terms, and will have the chance to leave behind the regional conflict dynamics it has been dealing with for decades. It will also have the opportunity to restore the republic’s “equal citizenship” principle, which has been eroded by the 50-year conflict environment.

From the radical Kurdish base , criticisms of the peace process are centered around “submission.” For the Kurds, this process coincides with a threshold where past demands are being reconsidered. Especially leaving behind politically and socially costly and conflicting demands such as separatism, federation or confederalism ; instead, the idea of ​​being partners of four different states in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran is far beyond a call for integration. Peace opens a window for Kurds to become political actors in the entire Middle East.

For liberal circles , the momentum that peace will bring is undeniable. The free inclusion of Kurds, the most organized segment of our country in terms of society, in important discussions on the protection of property, the constitutional guarantee of individual freedoms and the expansion of the area of ​​civil politics may pave the way for overcoming the current crises. In particular, circles that prioritize membership in the European Union may well consider the peace process as an opportunity to open many chapters that the EU has set as a condition.

And finally, the Turkish nationalist base . Even for this segment, peace indicates a pragmatic benefit. Resolving the Kurdish issue domestically instead of being an international crisis with many actors could increase Turkey’s domestic consolidation and foreign policy flexibility. In this respect, peace can be read not only as a social but also a geopolitical investment for Turkish nationalists.

Targeting the future, not the regime: Potential is reality.

The statement, “There will be no democratization with this regime,” is a kind of fatalism . However, history is the sum of the interventions of those who tried to change fate.

No one has to defend this regime to ward off criticism of the peace process. In fact, despite all the persistent jabs in the media for months, no one has yet defended the current regime. It is difficult to understand why anyone would expect this to happen at this point.

Today, peace is not just a “give-and-take bargaining” around a table; it is a field of possibilities that will push the boundaries of social imagination. It is not a politics confined to the intention of the state, but a constituent power that relies on the insistence of the people.

The main question we have reached in the peace struggle with the PKK laying down its arms is this: Will we say 'Democracy cannot come out of here' and take the regime's limits as a basis, or will we, as 85 million people, push the limits of our own power?