Göksel Göksu wrote: CHP took its place in the commission, what will happen now?

According to political rumors, the CHP's absence from the commission to be established within the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) means the absence of Türkiye's leading party. In this case, it's impossible to say that the will of Parliament has been manifested. More importantly, a commission without the CHP would weaken public acceptance, complicate the process, and escalate tensions within society. This crisis, which neither the ruling parties, the Democratic Party (DEM), nor the CHP wanted, has finally been resolved. The commission to be established within the TBMM will make decisions by a qualified majority, and the CHP will take its place on the committee.

The People's Alliance calls it a "Turkey Without Terrorism," the MHP calls it "National Unity and Solidarity," and the DEM Party and PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan define it as the "Peace and Democratic Society Process." The CHP, on the other hand, refuses to accept definitions that exclude "democracy," but the process continues to advance regardless. Öcalan made his call, the PKK dissolved itself, and weapons were burned in Sulaymaniyah, albeit symbolically.

When we started, no one thought it would be easy. And it wasn't…

At the outset, no one—those who voiced this possibility and those who didn't—disregarded the possibility that the situation could flip at any moment. They still don't; even today, no one abandons "caution." From the highest levels of government to the smallest units of society, everyone views the issue with "cautious optimism," influenced by past experiences. The word "cautious" here maintains the possibility that anything could happen at any moment.

The new process, which was initiated by Devlet Bahçeli by shaking hands with members of the DEM Party on October 1, 2024, has reached today under these conditions; by proceeding cautiously and cautiously… The cautious steps taken by the parties are preparing to cross a new threshold with the commission to be established under the roof of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

However, this time, the CHP, which has been excluded from the process until now, will also be at the table.

It is observed that the CHP, which announced that it would take its place at the table after it was announced that the commission to be established in the Turkish Grand National Assembly would make decisions with a qualified majority, is both eager and extremely cautious.

He is willing because, from the very beginning of the process, both he and the DEM Party have advocated that the negotiations should be conducted openly and transparently under the roof of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and what they wanted came true.

He's cautious because, no matter how much he wants the guns to fall silent, he maintains that silence is only possible in a democratic climate. When he speaks of democracy, he turns to the operations against his party since March 19th. When he looks there, he sees the municipalities he won on March 31st, a historic victory, slipping away one by one; mayors, especially his declared presidential candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu, high-ranking municipal bureaucrats, and numerous employees being arrested without even an indictment; and the successive lawsuits filed to annul the congresses that propelled Özgür Özel to the party leadership. He sees Selahattin Demirtaş, Figen Yüksekdağ, and other political prisoners.

There's something else he sees: Judging by the membership distribution on the upcoming commission , he realizes that, despite his desire to be a part of it, the AK Party will be represented by 21 members, the MHP by 4, and HUDA PAR and DSP by 1 each. With 11 members, he won't be able to play a decisive role in any decision-making. Even if the New Path Party has 3, and the YRP, TİP, EMEP, and DP each have 1 MP, the situation remains unchanged.

In this case, the CHP said that in the commission, whose membership had dropped from 51 to 48 after the İYİ Party announced that it would not participate, it would not sit at the table if there would be no “equal representation or qualified majority” and placed the demand for “democracy” in the middle of the table as an indispensable clause.

Although the place of the "democracy" demand on the commission's agenda will be shaped after the commission convenes, the likelihood of it taking its place on the agenda has now become stronger after it was confirmed that decisions will be taken by qualified majority.

What I've explained so far is just the visible side of the coin. The invisible side of the issue is the traffic being conducted behind the scenes to ensure the CHP's presence at the negotiating table.

During this period, the ruling party was particularly careful to keep the door open to ensure continued contact. Even while the Speaker of Parliament, who will return to his duties in Ankara on July 31st, was in Geneva, intense backstage contact continued uninterrupted.

The DEM Party was always active to do its part in reaching a consensus, and was ready to take a position when it was not.

During this period, the CHP, while weighing the social pressure not to participate in the commission, continued its efforts to create a platform that would not provoke a reaction from these segments and that would not slow down the momentum the party had been riding on since March 19th, and would even accelerate that momentum… It seems that it was initially successful, but it appears that the direction of those reactions will be shaped by the stance it will take in the commission from now on.

Although the authorities were tight-lipped about the content of the talks because the issue was so sensitive, the establishment of a commission without the CHP was not something the parties desired.

In response to the question “Will a commission be established without the CHP?”, the response behind the scenes was “Yes, it can be established, but that commission will be lame.”

The reason is clear: excluding the CHP from the commission established under the auspices of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to ensure consensus on decisions and potential legal regulations regarding such a sensitive issue would mean the absence of Turkey's leading party. This would make it difficult to convey to the public that the will of Parliament had been manifested. More importantly, the prevailing view was that "a commission without the CHP would weaken social acceptance, complicate the process, and escalate tensions within society..." It's stated that neither the ruling parties, the Democratic Party (DEM) Party, nor the CHP want this scenario. The prevailing view is that this approach has been effective in resolving the issue. So, what will happen now? Which party will come to the table with which demands when the commission is established?

The DEM Party attaches great importance to the solution of this 40-50 year old problem and does not want the solution to be used as material for daily politics.

Their approach is this: Reducing the issue to disarmament would be trivializing the issue. Politicians being linked to terrorism for trivial reasons and prevented from engaging in politics poses a challenge, and we have a historic opportunity to find a solution. The groundwork for democratic politics must be laid, existing legal frameworks must be expanded, and political detention in prisons must end. They consider this important, deem it crucial for the issue to be discussed on a political level, and argue, "Concessions can be made if necessary."

One of the CHP's concerns is the possibility of constitutional amendments being brought to the agenda of this commission. Özgür Özel's stance on the matter is clear: "A constitution cannot be made with something that doesn't comply with the constitution," he says.

Democracy is also among the CHP's red lines. They want the word "democracy" to be included in the commission's name and on its agenda. In short, they say, "The commission should not only address the disarmament issue but also the democratization of Türkiye." While operations targeting CHP-run municipalities continue, one of the topics they want addressed is the adoption of trial without detention in political cases.

The ruling party and the opposition do not see each other as a single entity. Those who position the AKP separately, citing President and AKP Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's naming of the process as a "Turkey Without Terrorism," believe that the AKP's sole expectation from the commission to be established is how to disarm and how to integrate those who disarm. According to these groups, regardless of the topics on the commission's agenda, once the disarmament process is underway, the commission will be diluted, rendered dysfunctional, and its lifespan will end.

The MHP wing of the alliance, or more precisely, MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli, is viewed not as the ruling party but as the "voice of the state," and the DEM wing, in particular, interprets every "crypto message" coming from Bahçeli through this lens. At this stage, the question of what the "state" expects from the commission takes on particular significance.

As an example of this difference, the new process that Erdoğan describes as "Türkiye without Terrorism" is given as an example by the MHP's use of "National Unity and Solidarity".

Which of these demands and expectations will find a place in the commission, or even whether they will, will become clear when the commission begins its work. Representatives of the political parties will shape the issues to be addressed by the commission based on a qualified majority decision. Decisions and proposals that receive 3/5 of the votes will be submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. If the İYİ Party does not participate, the commission will have 48 members, and 27 members from the ruling party, including 21 from the AKP and 4 from the MHP. Considering the 3/5 ratio, the number of members required for a decision to pass the commission corresponds to 28.8. At this stage, the votes cast by other political parties, especially the DEM Party, will be crucial, as it appears that their votes will shape the decisions to be made.