The Karlsruhe Strategy: How the SPD could overthrow Merz and elect Klingbeil as chancellor in five steps

What appears to be a stalled personnel debate could actually be the first move in a long-term chess game. While the public and media are busy dealing with the controversial candidacy of Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf , behind the scenes, the debate may already be about far more than just a position on the Federal Constitutional Court.

Constitutional lawyer Josef Franz Lindner, Professor of Law at the University of Augsburg, sees the election of the judges not as a mere episode of party-political bickering, but as the key to a far-reaching strategic project: the return of the SPD to the Chancellery with the help of the Federal Constitutional Court.

Election of judges, ban of the AfD and then back to the Chancellery?

Lindner's scenario is based on a chain of legally possible, but politically highly controversial, steps. On Platform X, he writes: "The current discussion about one of the candidates is superficial. It obscures the real motivation, namely the SPD's strategic power option in a purely left-wing alliance. This option consists of several building blocks."

The starting point of his considerations is the election of constitutional judges, which he describes as “a decisive step on their way back to the Chancellery,” and the formation of a majority in the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court, which is at stake in the allocation of judicial posts.

It is precisely there, in the Second Senate, that a possible AfD ban procedure would be negotiated. According to Lindner's analysis, the SPD is nominating candidates who have publicly expressed support for such a procedure. Just a few weeks ago, the party had agreed to prepare AfD ban proceedings.

Lindner argues that the election of the two Social Democrat candidates would set the course for a political reorganization. Should the Federal Constitutional Court ban the AfD—a move that could be made within two to three years—150 AfD Bundestag seats would automatically be lost.

The number of MPs would then shrink to around 479. The Chancellor's majority would be reduced to just 240 votes. The SPD, the Greens, and the Left Party would together hold 269 seats. The mathematical majority for a red-red-green coalition would be achieved. A takeover of power without new elections would be possible through a constructive vote of no confidence under Article 67 of the Basic Law.

Klingbeil would become chancellor, Olaf Scholz would likely remain in the cabinet, and the new coalition could govern until 2029. An AfD, crushed by the ban ruling, would be unlikely to be replaced by then. A new right-of-center party would have little time to build structures. And the CDU/CSU? According to Lindner, it would have been publicly disempowered, partly responsible for the judicial election and the ban: "For the CDU/CSU, this means it may be only two steps away from political suicide."

For the lawyer, one thing is clear: The SPD will stick with its candidates – not out of spite, but out of strategy. A withdrawal would be tantamount to a self-inflicted setback. For the CDU, however, the situation is delicate: If it agrees, it could contribute to its own loss of power. If it blocks the proposal, a constitutional and political conflict threatens, coupled with the accusation of tolerating AfD sympathies within its own ranks.

It's a scenario that raises many questions. Josef Franz Lindner's analysis shows that the fight for the constitutional judgeships is not just a dispute over suitability or morality. It's about the bigger picture—in his scenario, even about the strategic reform of the republic.