Mehmet Tatlı wrote: The bankruptcy of Atatürkist intellectualism in the Kurdish issue and the weaponization of Kurdish memory against Kurds

While July 12, 2025 should have been considered a historic day in Turkish history when a kind of “apartheid” regime was exposed and liquidated by the highest authority of the state, and even given self-criticism, it fell victim to the hysteria of some people who pretended to be opinion leaders for the CHP.

Turkey's intellectual history is also the history of what is left unsaid regarding the Kurdish issue.

The driving force of intellectualism in all societies is a free academy and a free press. In Turkey, universities and the media have been circling around a conceptual void they define as "Atatürk nationalism" regarding the Kurdish issue for a century. Aside from a few amorphous phrases like "everyone is Turkish and equal," no one can define what this concept is or within what legitimate or ethical framework it is conceptualized; to define it would expose its disconnect from reality and render it debatable.

The function of Atatürk’s nationalism lies precisely in this ambiguity: It functions as a field that can build power only as long as it remains undefined.

Yet, since the founding of the republic in 1923, the world and humanity have undergone enormous transformations: the rise of fascism in Europe, the establishment of the United Nations and the global legal order, the construction of the European Union, the elimination of colonialism in the global south, the Cold War, national liberation movements, neoliberalism, the institutionalization of terrorism, and proxy wars… While all of these transformations triggered radical hegemonic transformations in all states and political forms on the globe, Atatürkist thought, on the other hand, saw itself as exempt from all these transformations and remained in an immutable capsule, outside of time and space.

However, the scientific method, above all, is to identify what exists, that is, reality, to explain it, and to attempt to define it by drawing on literature. The most important reason why the study of the Kurdish issue in Turkish academia is prohibited lies in the crisis experienced by the scientific method within the nation's formation process. Studying the Kurdish issue begins, above all, with accepting the Kurd and his reality. This, in turn, becomes the dynamite laid under the guise of Atatürk's nationalism.

Kemalist intellectuals, who today target the Kurdish movement with statements that unfortunately amount to nothing more than bluster, have not even "deigned" to discuss this theory of nationhood, let alone update it, for a century. Indeed, the fact that reality itself cannot be explained by any thesis that approximates Kemalism is, at this point, their own fault.

Debates surrounding the peace process have been ongoing in Türkiye for at least 30 years. Not a single Kemalist intellectual has yet uttered a single sentence that offers an alternative to the state's rhetoric. If they're not doing this to preserve their gains within the regime, they're simply failing to do so out of "ignorance," to put it mildly.

In this intellectual dogmatism, the reluctance of massive bureaucratic structures like the CHP, the most powerful political entity of Kemalism, is understandable to a certain extent. However, even independent individuals who consider themselves "intellectuals" have still not touched this field. On the contrary, they have accused the handful of those who have attempted it of treason and excommunicated them from both Turkishness and academia. The reality of İsmail Beşikçi, who was tried for years at the State Security Court, has become one of the most concrete consequences of the academic inquisition.

This state of intellectual barrenness isn't limited to laziness or complacency. The control of academia by the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) and the press by the regime's racist apparatuses, such as the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK), has a significant impact on this process, which has resulted in the "ignorance of the intellectual."

On the other hand, even in France, to which Türkiye imported the republic, the nature of the republic changed several times in the last century in line with the internal and external developments.

This stagnation in Türkiye leaves many chronic problems, especially the Kurdish and women's issues, unresolved. Because, above all, solutions require generating ideas.

Indeed, their supposedly "principled" support for the peace process, which they were unable to hinder, has amounted to nothing more than a few rhetorical sentences. They can't go further than, "Of course, we should deal with the past, but..."

The Kurdish movement, while struggling for existence in this century, developed and tested dozens of different theories of nationhood and coexistence, abandoning them when they failed and creating new ones. It followed Marxism, encountered cultural Islamism, engaged with liberal democracy, and integrated with feminist and ecological paradigms. Rather than absolutizing ideology, it transformed it through critique. It didn't kill its ideas, it transformed them.

Although Turkish intellectuals still don't realize it, "Kurd" in the Middle East today doesn't just mean an identity. It means a political position, a social model, an alternative vision. Thanks to this intellectual dynamism, Kurds have become one of the region's most influential actors.

The Kurdish issue is not a folkloric issue, as Atatürkist intellectuals often portray it. It is certainly not a purely representative democracy issue. The Kurdish issue is a matter of existence or non-existence. And not just in an ontological sense; it is a matter of hegemony. It is a matter of the obstacles placed in the way of the Kurdish democratic will, and the way these obstacles force hegemony into racist traps. It is a matter of the life vision Kurds have developed for themselves being considered an organized crime. It is a matter of assimilation and colonization. Moreover, it is a massive hegemony issue that has emerged not only within the Republic of Türkiye but also in four countries in the region.

The Atatürkists' claim that this problem is solely a problem of representative democracy and that the solution should be developed only through the DEM Party and the Turkish Grand National Assembly stems from a lack of knowledge or understanding of this problem and its depth.

"Legal politics" is not, and has never been, the strongest wing of the Kurdish movement. On the contrary, the Kurdish movement was forced to thrive in an atmosphere of illegality. It was able to go underground and to ascend to the top, survive through cross-border mobility, and build international relations encompassing global powers. Socially and culturally, the transformation the PKK has wrought on the Kurds, and the hegemony that inevitably resulted from this transformation, far surpasses the influence of the DEM Party and its predecessors. However, it is hoped that once peace is established and "illegality" is ended, the DEM Party will become the most important Kurdish entity and will continue to grow in Turkish politics.

Today, the accusation of "amnesia" by some Kemalist circles against Kurds at every step in the peace process is not only arrogant; it's also an unethical distortion. Indeed, during the years when Kurds' memories, overflowing with human rights violations, were forming, they were either applauding the regime or remaining silent. Today, they cling to the hypocrisy that they care more about what happens to Kurds than about the Kurds themselves.

Denial, destruction, and assimilation… Trustees, unsolved murders, the displacement of millions of people from their lands, massacres, judicial conspiracies… None of these were issues of representative democracy, and they have not been forgotten. These were rights violations directly targeting the right to life. It will never be forgotten, especially, that these events took place within a "Turkish national consensus" of which the CHP was a founding subject. However, without using this memory as a tool for settling scores with anyone—including the CHP—the Kurds have transformed it into a legacy that will define the ethical boundaries of a new vision of founding will.

July 12th marked a historic moment when Erdoğan and—by virtue of his presidency—the Republic of Turkey recognized the Kurdish reality politically and historically, irrevocably. Öcalan's claim that "the struggle for existence has successfully concluded," which he used as justification for the dissolution of the PKK, was fully confirmed by Erdoğan. For the Kurds, this date can be considered a turning point, marking the end of the phase of "denial" and the beginning of the phase of democratic struggle and freedom.

While under normal circumstances July 12, 2025 should have been considered a historic day in Turkish history when a kind of “apartheid” regime was exposed and liquidated by the highest authority of the state, and even self-criticized, it fell victim to the hysteria of some people who pretended to be opinion leaders for the CHP.

In his speech, Erdoğan, referring to the peace process, declared, "AKP-MHP-DEM are walking together," as it happened before everyone's eyes, and social media erupted in uproar. Propaganda about the DEM Party joining the People's Alliance flooded the Atatürkist press and academic circles. The Kurds' relentless struggle for existence, starting from scratch, against the Republic of Turkey, the Assad dynasty, the Saddam regime, al-Qaeda, ISIS, feudalism, neoliberalism, traditional morality, masculinity, and Islamist reactionism was disregarded, and they were even accused of neo-Ottomanism and pursuing sultanism. Minutes later, Pervin Buldan's statement, "What Erdoğan is talking about is a process alliance, not an electoral alliance. Everyone has a different path. Our path is different," was—with great malice—deservedly ignored. These circles also ignored Ahmet Türk's condition for his return to office that the trustees appointed to CHP municipalities be reinstated. This black propaganda they fabricated quickly encircled the CHP base.

The fundamental challenge for the CHP in the resolution process is not only how it positions itself, but whether it can establish the intellectual and social foundations upon which to build this position. The pro-opening stance represented by Özgür Özel, Ekrem İmamoğlu, and the Kurds within the CHP can easily be neutralized within a regime of manipulation dominated by reflexes generated by the media and academia. Unless the CHP fills this intellectual void that allows it to maintain its political position, any constructive steps toward the Kurdish issue may continue to be sabotaged from within. The party could fall into a state of vulnerability where its relations with the Kurds are manipulated by a group of agitators. If these agitational narratives gain strength and visibility, and attempts are made to portray the principled votes or support some Kurds give the CHP with the thesis that "Kurds are also against the resolution process," the CHP could lose all of its DEM voters—both rural and urban—right next to it.

Assuming that DEM Kurds, regardless of their socio-economic or geographic affiliation, will choose the CHP despite their opposition to the peace process is simply a sign of blindness. The peace process is the final phase of a century-long struggle for existence. This blindness, which ignores the emotional landscape of the Kurds, could become the most costly link in the century-long blindness of Atatürkist intellectuals for the CHP and Turkey.

Because the Kurds, having shattered the denial, will face the next phase of their organized struggle: the establishment of a state governed by the rule of law, the shift in the gender paradigm, and the democratization of secularism and the republic. The desire to lead Türkiye towards sultanism and autocracy will grow as the rift between the CHP and the Kurds escalates.