New Polish president set for foreign policy power struggle with government

By Olivier Sorgho

Poland's ruling coalition was dealt a major blow in June's presidential election , when opposition candidate Karol Nawrocki defeated government-aligned Rafał Trzaskowski. The incoming president is likely to be even more hostile to the government's liberal, pro-EU agenda than the incumbent Andrzej Duda.

Foreign policy could be a major flashpoint. "I expect Nawrocki to be a far more assertive president than Duda, considering his more combative character and different vision of foreign policy. He is a fighter," says Dr. Bruno Surdel, senior fellow at the Center for International Relations.

Since replacing Law and Justice (PiS) in power in 2023, the ruling coalition, led by Donald Tusk's Civic Platform (PO) party, has continued to pursue Poland's long-standing policy of relying on the United States for security.

However, it has also sought to repair relations with Brussels that were damaged under the former administration. Poland revived the Weimar triangle alliance with Germany and France and began positioning itself as a continental leader in security and defense policy while continuing to support Ukraine.

“The impact of Nawrocki on Polish foreign policy will above all be indirect,” says Piotr Buras, head of the Warsaw office at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

“The key question is how Tusk will react to Nawrocki's rhetoric, given his weakened position after the election and awareness that [political] moods have shifted owing to the election of Trump and a change in [Polish] attitudes towards Ukraine.”

The president's foreign policy powers

Under Poland's constitution, foreign policy is primarily conducted by the government, which sets the diplomatic agenda and signs international treaties.

However, when such treaties require parliamentary legislation, the president can exercise his veto. The head of state also appoints ambassadors, based on nominations submitted by the foreign minister and approved by the prime minister.

The latter already led to a clash last year between the government and President Duda after foreign minister Radosław Sikorski dismissed 50 PiS-era ambassadors and installed interim embassy “heads” in their place. Among them was Bogdan Klich, who now represents Poland in the US.

Since Nawrocki's election win, PiS has been pushing for the presidential cabinet to reclaim control over the US ambassadorial appointment, pointing to Nawrocki's ties with Donald Trump, with whom he met during his campaign , in contrast to Klich's public criticism of the US president. Sikorski has also admitted that Nawrocki will help improve Poland's relations with the Trump administration.

Poland's president-elect may seek greater influence in other areas of foreign representation. “Nawrocki could, for example, based on legislation introduced under PiS in 2023, demand that he represent Poland at EU summits,” Buras says, adding that this would create another chapter in the ongoing rule-of-law crisis , as the government refuses to accept the legality of the law in question.

Trump, Europe, or both?

A cross-partisan political consensus viewing the US as a key ally still exists in Poland, but disagreements center on how to keep Washington on Warsaw's side, Buras says.

“Nawrocki will, through actions and rhetoric, prioritize the need for close, direct cooperation with President Trump, potentially at the expense of relations with EU partners,” he explains. By contrast, Tusk has so far sought to keep the US as a guarantor of European and Polish security by “strengthening the EU, also through its [common] defense policy.”

Trump's isolationism, including considering withdrawing some US soldiers stationed in Europe, has accelerated calls for the EU to rearm on its own. Poland's government has supported common initiatives such as the €800-billion “ReArm Europe” plan. However, PiS claims such projects diminish Polish sovereignty and its relationship with the US.

"The European Union is in chaos and is not ready to build its armed forces. These [EU rearmament plans] are pipe dreams, an attempt to build another NATO," Nawrocki said in March. Such narratives will only strengthen under his presidency, Buras argues.

The ruling coalition has also sought stronger bilateral ties with European allies. Poland in May signed a treaty with France that includes mutual security guarantees. The deal still requires the president's approval.

The agreement calls for prioritizing European manufacturers of military equipment, potentially at the expense of the US, which could cause friction with Trump and give Nawrocki a reason to oppose it. Poland is also pursuing similar deals with the United Kingdom and Germany.

Despite Nawrocki's alignment with Trump, there are areas of convergence between the president-elect, the Polish government, and EU allies like France, such as opposition to the EU-Mercosur trade deal . Nawrocki broadly supports the “East Shield” project, partly financed by the EU, to strengthen Poland's eastern borders.

Nawrocki also faces the risk of appearing over-reliant on and even submissive to Trump, says Tomasz Sawczuk, an analyst for Polityka Insight.

Tusk, meanwhile, cannot solely bet on strong ties with the likes of Germany due to criticism he faces from the conservative opposition, who often accuse him of representing German interests . Moreover, relations with Berlin have been tense to disagreements around Second World War reparations and migration .

Growing anti-Ukraine sentiment

Despite disagreements with Kyiv, including over cheap Ukrainian agricultural products entering European markets, Tusk and Duda have remained staunch allies of Ukraine during its war with Russia and have supported their ambitions to join the EU and NATO.

But domestic public opinion of Ukraine has turned increasingly negative. In January, 55.3% of Poles held a favorable view towards Ukrainians living in Poland, down from 64.4% in 2023, according to a poll by United Surveys for news outlet WP.

As of June, only 35% of Poles believe that Poland should support Ukraine's ambitions to join the EU, while 37% are in favor of supporting its NATO accession, a recent study has found. That is a marked drop from 2022, when a similar poll gave figures of 85% and 75%, respectively.

“We are witnessing a certain war fatigue among Poles,” says Surdel. Nawrocki has capitalized on this anti-Ukraine sentiment, becoming its political mouthpiece along with the far-right. During his presidential campaign, he signed a pledge to not send Polish troops to Ukraine and to oppose Kyiv's NATO membership plans.

Buras and Sawczuk say that Nawrocki will likely pressure the government to make continued Polish support for Kyiv conditional on concessions. The president-elect has said that he would oppose Kyiv's EU accession unless it resolves Polish historical grievances around the Volhynia massacres .

“Nawrocki will certainly push for a more interest-based policy of supporting Ukraine in return for concrete benefits,” says Sawczuk. Those may include looking for business deals similar to Ukraine's minerals agreement with the US, or demands that Ukraine stop memorializing nationalist leader Stepan Bandera , he explains.

"One would expect the government to wish to continue the policy of supporting Ukraine. At the same time, it will do so more cautiously than before, due to Nawrocki's presence and the domestic political threat from right-wing, or even far-right competitors, who are critical of Ukraine," he adds.

Buras points to trade as one area where the government may harden its stance towards Ukraine. The EU in early June reinstated duties and quotas on Ukrainian agricultural goods after Warsaw lobbied for the move. The new trade arrangement agreed in early July by the European Commission and Kyiv was criticized by Polish agricultural minister Czesław Siekierski.

Regional alliances to fend off Russia

Nawrocki's election win was cheered by right-wing politicians across Europe, including the Hungarian and Italian prime ministers, Viktor Orbán and Giorgia Meloni. That has led to speculation that Nawrocki could push for a realization of Poland's position in Europe, promoted up by Trump, with whom he shares a distrust of EU elites.

The president-elect has indicated that he would seek to strengthen the Visegrád Group, an alliance between Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. But Hungary and Slovakia's closeness to Russia could complicate such a project, Sawczuk cautions.

Buras argues that the Polish right and Nawrocki could frame alliances with politicians like Orbán and Slovakia's Prime Minister Robert Fico as pro-Trump, anti-EU and anti-Ukraine, rather than as explicit support for Russia.

However, Nawrocki is more likely to support Poland continuing to pursue regional security alliances with the Baltic and northern European states in the face of threats from Russia, the three experts told Notes from Poland. Poland recently signed a defense agreement with Sweden, which includes a commitment to bolster security in the Baltic Sea.

Along with Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland, Poland is exiting the Ottawa convention , which bans the use of anti-personnel landmines. The countries claim this is necessary to fend off threats from Russia and Belarus.

“Countries with proximity to Russia share common interests, as well as the common anxiety of an existential threat from Russia,” Sawczuk explains. He adds that the entire Polish political class has a degree of skepticism towards western European countries' willingness to defend Poland if it were necessary.

“Poland is indeed beginning to position itself as a northern European state,” argues Surdel. “With Finland and Sweden now part of NATO, and considering doubts around US support, such regional alliances are a strong starting point for defense policy.”

Domestic politics: a key driver of foreign policy

All three experts explain that Polish foreign policy in the medium term will largely be guided by the dynamics of domestic politics. The next Polish parliamentary elections will be held in 2027.

“The question is whether the government will seek to acquire [in 2027] voters from [the far-right] Confederation and PiS, which would entail speaking in a similar language to Nawrocki, or whether it will embark on a course of ideological confrontation, highlighting its pro-European, progressive, center-left approach,” Buras says, adding he believes the former is more likely.

Surdel and Sawczuk nonetheless emphasize that Nawrocki is a political novice – he had not previously stood for public office – which makes it difficult to predict his prediction and foreign policy course. Surdel suggests that his actions as president may differ from his tough campaign rhetoric, adding that presidents often evolve once they gauge the realities of being in office.

However, one area where the government and president are likely to cooperate is on continuing to invest in Poland's army. Poland is already NATO's top defense spender as a proportion of GDP. Tusk has announced plans to grow Poland's army personnel to 500,000 including reservists, while Nawrocki has floated a figure of 300,000.

“The build-up of Polish armed forces and investing in defense will massively impact Poland's international standing and foreign policy influence going forward. I do believe a consensus exists on this matter,” Surdel sums up.

Main image credits: Chancellery of the Prime Minister/Flickr , US Department of Homeland Security/Flickr , Gage Skidmore/Wikimedia Commons (under CC BY-SA 2.0 ). Collage created by Agata Pyka