The Achilles heel of Iron Dome and other Israeli defense systems that Iran wants to exploit

The escalation toward all-out war between Israel and Iran is leaving images of night skies lit up by explosions, cross-threats between the two nations, and a major unknown regarding the nuclear factor. Although Israel has its now well-known "Iron Dome," this exchange of attacks has exposed its vulnerabilities, something some experts have long warned about. International analyst and president of the Regional Coordination of Economic and Social Research (CRIES), Andrei Serbin Pont, explains to ABC the weaknesses of some of Israel's defense systems. A true Achilles' heel that Iran could exploit to its advantage.

Israel possesses one of the most sophisticated, multi-layered defensive architectures in the world . The most well-known is the "Iron Dome," designed to detect missiles as they are launched, with a range of up to 70 km. The system consists of a detection and tracking radar, a battle control center, and an armed launcher. This technological shield calculates the trajectory of enemy projectiles and intercepts them only if it estimates they will fall in populated areas. If the impact is expected in unpopulated areas, such as the desert, it is allowed to continue its course.

Currently, it is estimated that there are at least 10 mobile batteries operational covering the entire State of Israel. The government claims their effectiveness is around 90%. However, on October 7, 2023, this command was overwhelmed . According to the Israeli Army, in the first hours of the attack, Hamas launched 3,200 rockets, a number greater than the system's interceptors could handle.

Serbin explains that Iron Dome is a system specifically developed for small, short-range, non-nuclear missiles. "These can be drones, rockets, or mortars. The idea is basically that anything launched from near Israel can be stopped by an interceptor missile, which is designed to be relatively low-cost. And it can deal with targets as long as they don't have much maneuverability and aren't flying at high altitude or high speed," Serbin points out.

The problem is that "the Persian country is primarily launching ballistic missiles. These are medium- and long-range weapons that, due to their parabolic flight characteristics and hypersonic re-entry speeds , are very difficult to intercept ," Serbin points out. Iran is combining this offensive with swarms of drones and a barrage of other low-cost weapons. The idea is to overwhelm Israel's defenses with multiple weapons, so that its most sophisticated missiles have a greater chance of sneaking through and hitting their targets.

The New York Times has explained that these missiles can reach Israel in just 12 minutes , but there is much less time to make crucial decisions to stop them. But critical decisions must be made in seconds: satellites must detect the launch's heat signature, radars calculate its trajectory, and operators must decide whether to reserve their most valuable interceptors for the most dangerous projectiles.

The real challenge , Serbin points out, comes when hundreds of them are launched at once. Radars have a limit on how much they can track simultaneously, and the launchers, once emptied, can take half an hour or more to recharge," adds NYT. This is where other, more advanced layers of defense come in, designed to withstand attack from ballistic missiles, such as Arrow and David's Sling.

The medium-range David's Sling is designed to shoot down ballistic missiles fired from 100 to 200 km away. " They provide an intermediate layer of protection . They have a chance of intercepting ballistic missiles during reentry, but their effectiveness rate is lower," explains the CRIES expert.

While the Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 are long-range systems, they are designed to intercept ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere. They use a detachable warhead that collides with the target. "Specifically, this protective layer acts at the highest point of the parabola drawn by these projectiles. That's the ideal time to stop them, because once they're already falling, they can continue on and impact the target," says Serbin. This can happen in less than a minute. In addition, the Arrows also have to avoid the decoys they can carry to fool sensors.

The issue is on the subject of hypersonic missiles, such as the Fattah-1 . Serbin clarifies that ballistic missiles are often confused with hypersonic missiles. The former only reach hypersonic speeds upon re-entry, while true hypersonic missiles do so throughout their entire trajectory. "And since they don't have a parabolic trajectory and fly at cruising speed, their detection is much more difficult and gives much less reaction time . In theory, there are hypersonic missile developments by Iran, and they are actually almost impossible to shoot down with current systems," Serbin points out.

The United States has already provided Israel with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, designed to destroy short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, both inside and outside the atmosphere, in their final phase of flight. Serbin believes it could also deploy more of its naval vessels in the vicinity of Israel, as they did during the October 2023 attacks. A destroyer with the AEGIS integrated naval air defense system could significantly contribute to intercepting ballistic missiles. "But the priority should probably be how to dramatically expand Arrow missile production," Serbin comments.

For short-range defenses, there are the Patriots, but they have a range of about 19 kilometers and can only protect limited areas. Another possible reinforcement: the Massive Ordnance Penetrator , a 13,600-kilogram bomb designed to destroy heavily reinforced Iranian bunkers.

The NYT concludes that in a prolonged conflict, the imbalance could end up being a matter of mathematics: who will run out of missiles first? Serbín agrees, "As Israel's anti-aircraft capabilities wear down—because they can be corroded by sheer numbers—production of Arrow missiles, which are produced in small quantities and at high cost, declines ."

He added: "Today, we're seeing that perhaps 4% of the ballistic missiles Iran launches manage to penetrate Israel's defenses. But if that capability decreases, there's a risk that the effectiveness rate could increase dramatically."