The Hegseth Strategy: How the US Secretary of Defense wants to reposition America

Trump has instincts, but no strategy. There's no clear picture of the order he's striving for, especially with regard to relations with his opponents/competitors China and Russia. Accordingly, there's no clear path the administration as a whole is pursuing.

This opens up space for key players in foreign and security policy to forge their own path. One example is Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, who is currently trying to push Trump onto a harder line toward Moscow.

The Secretary of Defense is also pursuing such a strategy of his own. Pete Hegseth, along with Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Senator Lindsey Graham, is among the hawks who advocate a "peace through strength" approach – and are secretly less than pleased by Trump's never-ending hopes for a grand "deal" with Russia and China.

They thus represent the majority of Republicans; only a minority favors either isolationism or an understanding with Moscow and Beijing that should lead to comprehensive cooperation.

As head of the powerful Defense Department, Hegseth enjoys a strong institutional position. He uses this position to implement a "hawkish" policy based on military strength—on gaining an edge in the competition with China for military leadership and on maintaining the status quo in Europe and Asia.

Unlike Trump, Hegseth pursues a clear, consistent line: It's about keeping the adversaries Russia and China in check. Because these adversaries have gained considerable military strength and clout in recent years and decades, this requires a restructuring of the American positioning.

From the Pentagon's perspective, the main opponent is clearly China; this is also the general consensus among Democrats and Republicans alike. China is considered a " near- peer competitor" that threatens American dominance, at least in Asia. Moreover, according to the analysis, China also wants to build a different world system, one that is entirely focused on Beijing.

Compared to the Chinese challenge, Russia is seen as a distraction. While Russia can cause trouble, it is unable to challenge American primacy.

The third premise of the Hegseth strategy is that the US's ability to compete with its adversaries/competitors is far more limited today than it was during the Cold War.

Thanks to globalization, which was decisively promoted by the USA, China is now economically far stronger than the Soviet Union ever was.

It follows that America cannot take on both adversaries, Russia and China, alone – especially not simultaneously, if, for example, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is followed by a Russian attack on the Baltic states.

Credible deterrence and successful containment of both adversaries inevitably require allies to shoulder a far greater share of the burden. "Ultimately, a strong, determined, and capable network of allies and partners is our central strategic advantage," Hegseth recently explained at the Shangri-La Security Conference in Singapore.

From an American perspective, it is only fair that Europe rearms; 5 percent of economic output is now considered the new norm, a figure that will likely be confirmed at the NATO summit in The Hague at the end of June.

What's new is that the US also expects this from its Asian allies. The Asian allies should take the Europeans as a model, Hegseth recently explained at the Shangri-La Security Conference in Singapore: "NATO members, even Germany, have committed to spending 5 percent of their economic output on defense. It makes no sense for countries in Europe to do this while key allies in Asia spend less on defense in the face of an even greater threat."

It is also obvious, however, that the United States would bear the brunt of any war in the Indo-Pacific that could follow a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Allies like Japan currently have very limited military capabilities and would only play a supporting role.

The situation is different in Europe, which has become a secondary theater from the US perspective. Here, Washington expects the Europeans to largely assume responsibility for conventional defense in the future. It is obvious that this is not feasible with the current European armies. But it is also clear that Washington expects the Europeans to very quickly assume responsibility for their own defense in the coming years.

Hegseth made this very clear in his speech in Brussels in February. America is "prioritizing" the Indo-Pacific over Europe, he said, "making a trade-off in terms of resources, recognizing the reality of scarcity."

Together, they could establish a "division of labor" that "maximizes our comparative advantages in Europe and the Pacific." And once again, they emphasized: NATO can only survive if "our European allies enter the arena and assume responsibility for conventional security in Europe."

Behind Hegseth stands a name well-known in expert circles: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State at the Pentagon Elbridge Colby. Colby is the intellectual architect of Hegseth's strategy; he had also been considered as a possible security advisor to Trump.

Colby was already the author of the National Defense Strategy during the first Trump administration and has written several books on American strategy. He is not a "Trumpian" by nature, but rather a combative Republican intellectual who has taken every opportunity in recent years to make it clear to the Europeans what is expected of them in the future—a radically different burden-sharing model.

Just as Senator Lindsey Graham is trying to forge a tool for Trump to use against Russia when he is ready, Hegseth and Colby are trying to develop a strategic realignment that Trump can get behind when he wants to.

The element of this strategy that clearly suits Trump is the reduction of the American military presence in Europe. When it comes to Europe, the president always thinks of two things: an alleged trade imbalance and a parasitic exploitation of American protection. With the demand for 5 percent military spending, Hegseth is very much in line with Trump's demands.

The situation is different in Asia, however. Even if Asian allies such as Japan, the Philippines, or South Korea significantly increase their military capabilities, the United States would have to bear the brunt of a military conflict with China in the event of an emergency.

A far-reaching American withdrawal, which is becoming increasingly likely for Europe, cannot be achieved for Asia.

Even though China lacks combat experience and Russia is somewhat better equipped in terms of military technology, it is a completely different opponent, simply because of the enormous mass of military equipment it possesses.

Whether the United States could even win a conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific is a controversial topic in the United States. And if China continues to make technological advances and catches up with America in artificial intelligence, computer chips, and robotics, this balance could shift even further to the United States' disadvantage.

But what Trump wants with regard to China remains a mystery. Does he want to weaken and contain his strategic rival, or is he committed to cooperation, a kind of "G-2" or condominium of the superpowers? Is he willing to make territorial concessions to China in order to encourage it to cooperate?

However, there is much to suggest that Trump will not really make any progress with China – that the current chaotic mix of contradictory signals will remain, with no clear direction.

In retrospect, the Hegseth Doctrine could then turn out to be another building block in a consistent development of the USA towards an intensified geopolitical rivalry with China – in line with the first Trump administration and also the Biden administration, which followed Trump in this respect.

This is also supported by the fact that Hegseth and Colby's line is supported by a broad consensus in Washington; a consensus that is likely to be more decisive than the trials and tribulations of a president who makes big announcements in front of the television camera but implements little in the way of concrete action.