Two more examples of the nationalist’s dilemma

I’ve already done several posts on the internal contradictions of nationalism. The Financial Times recently offered two such examples in a single issue. Before considering the first example, recall that a portion of Romania contains a large ethnic Hungarian population living in a region that was once a part of Hungary. Here’s the FT:

Viktor Orbán’s support for an ultranationalist candidate in Romania’s presidential election has prompted a backlash in the Hungarian diaspora, potentially jeopardising the Hungarian leader’s own election chances next year.

Romania is home to about 1mn ethnic Hungarians, many with dual nationality, who have been a crucial source of support for Orbán’s nationalist Fidesz party. But many of them have been incensed by his recent endorsement of George Simion — a populist with a history of physical and verbal violence against Hungarian speakers.

“Hungary’s leader seems to have loftier plans than the fate of Hungarians in Transylvania,” said Szilárd Toth, a history professor at the Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj.

Nationalism derives much of its power from resentment against other nationalities. This creates a dilemma—should nationalist leaders look to align with nationalists in other countries, or with minority groups that share their ethnicity?

President Trump has frequently expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin. Both are authoritarian nationalists that believe big countries should dominate small countries. During the recent campaign, Trump suggested that he would be able to almost immediately end the war in Ukraine, presumably by using his influence with Putin, as well as by pressuring Ukraine (which relies heavily on US aid.) The Trump administration even went so far as to join Russia, Iran and North Korea in voting against a UN resolution that blamed Russia for starting the war in Ukraine.

Under pressure from the US, Ukraine has indeed agreed to a ceasefire that would leave Russia in control of a significant portion of Ukrainian territory. But Putin refuses to agree to the ceasefire, causing frustration in the Trump administration. Another FT story explains the situation:

When US vice-president JD Vance was asked about the war in Ukraine at a foreign policy forum in Washington last week, diplomats were expecting Maga-style criticism of Kyiv and veiled sympathy for Russia.

Instead, they heard something quite different. Vance said of a set of Russian proposals to end the conflict: “We think they’re asking for too much.”

The phrase “Maga-style criticism” refers to the fact that many people in the Trump camp live in an alternative reality where Ukraine is to blame for the war and Zelenskyy is a bloodthirsty dictator. But even people living in an epistemic bubble must eventually face the reality that Russia is the aggressor:

Vance’s comments were part of a noticeable shift in tone by the Trump administration. US officials appear increasingly impatient with Vladimir Putin, as suspicions grow that the Russian leader, rather than Zelenskyy, may be the biggest obstacle to peace.

“The Americans had this simplistic idea — let’s charm Russia, put pressure on Zelenskyy, and we’ll get a deal,” said Wolfgang Ischinger, the former German ambassador to the US to whom Vance made his comment at last week’s forum. “It turned out that simply charming Russia is not enough.”

Putin may share Trump’s authoritarian nationalist perspective, but he doesn’t share Trump’s view of “America First”. Trump faces a dilemma. Should he align the US with other authoritarian nationalists, or should he align the US with other regimes that share our national interest?

The Trump administration offered major concessions to Russia before the negotiations even began, including a statement that Ukraine would never join Nato, as well as an offer that the US could accept the Russian acquisition of Crimea. I’m no expert on “the art of the deal”, but I’d always assumed that you’d at least wait for the negotiations to begin before offering concessions.