Mehmet Tatlı wrote | Escalation with Israel: What might Hakan Fidan's Rojava policy cost Türkiye?

When ISIS brutally attacked Rojava in 2014, Syrian Kurds turned their attention to Türkiye, seeking support. Türkiye's hostile stance resulted in the US establishing itself in the region. Today, as Syrian Kurds extend a hand of peace to Türkiye, Ankara's rhetorical and threatening language whets the appetite of Israel, which seeks to establish a presence in the region. The government in Türkiye has not changed. The same figures are on the verge of repeating the same mistake a second time.

Direct conflict between Türkiye and Israel remains a distant possibility. While Trump's interest in the region has waned significantly, it's clear that he will not allow either side to fully control the region or engage in direct conflict with one another.

However, even the smallest intervention by Turkey in the fragile status quo in Syria could trigger a domino effect. The issue isn't just about the military capabilities of the actors, but also the room for maneuver allowed by the balance of power in the region. As the US withdraws, new dynamics have the potential to disrupt Ankara's plans.

There are two opposing forces in the region regarding minority policies: Turkey and Israel. Türkiye's approach has remained unchanged since 1923; the natural Arab-Persian-Turkish alliance, based on suppressing Kurdish movements in its neighbors, has prevailed. As the Arabs and Persians weaken, Turkey is the last strong pillar of this equation. Israel, on the other hand, has been in conflict with the Arabs since 1948 and sees non-Arab communities as strategic partners.

Since the fall of Assad, Türkiye and Israel have been in competition in Syria. Today, this conflict could escalate into a struggle for hegemony over minority politics. Fidan's threatening language demonstrates Ankara's willingness to take risks. So, what awaits Türkiye?

Ankara's first and easiest option is to force HTS to fight the SDF. However, HTS is believed to be unsympathetic to this due to its current power asymmetry. However, if Ankara somehow brings HTS into the picture, Israel could leverage its policy toward non-Arab minorities and exploit the situation. It could launch effective airstrikes on Tel Aviv, Damascus, and directly against the Sharaa government. Israel could create the groundwork to politically undermine the HTS regime, if not completely overthrow it. Or, it could mobilize the Druze in the south and the Alawites in the west to force HTS to defend its territories.

It's difficult to predict whether Türkiye will counter this scenario. Ankara's options are already quite limited: providing air support to HTS or entering Rojava by land.

If Turkey deems Israel's response to HTS's attacks on Kurds to be "tolerable" and sustainable, Ankara could offer air support to Damascus forces fighting the SDF. This would also be a further test of Israel's resolve regarding its minority policy.

Türkiye's air support is possible because Turkish jets don't need to enter Syrian airspace for Rojava attacks. This geographical advantage is a powerful trump card for Ankara, eliminating the possibility of a confrontation between Türkiye and Israel in Syrian airspace.

By engaging in the Rojava war from the air rather than from the ground, Ankara will not create the perception of “annexation,” will not overshadow the potential victory of the Interim Syrian Administration (HTS), and will avoid the possibility of direct confrontation with Israel.

With the support of Turkish jets, HTS will undoubtedly launch more effective attacks against the SDF. However, Ankara's main fear is that Israel will escalate tensions with actions that send a message not only to HTS but also to Türkiye. Indeed, while not widely reported in the media, Israeli jets have struck positions near the Turkish border several times. Ankara has never seriously reacted to these attacks.

It's clear that if Türkiye deploys troops into Syria, all regional and global actors will perceive this step as an attempt at "annexation." Indeed, the elimination of Rojava is only possible by permanently replacing it with a more powerful instrument of force. Within Turkey, there are a significant number of neo-Ottomanists or followers of the Ummah who see this as a historic opportunity. However, Türkiye's land-based entry scenario is an extremely risky move.

Israel has long awaited such a move from Ankara. Tel Aviv could offset the potential for Türkiye's renewed disruption of the balance of power by ending the HTS regime and shifting the Damascus regime to its own advantage. This doesn't appear difficult or costly for Israel. Israel could use Israeli- and US-backed armed groups and the Druze as ground forces to oust HTS from Damascus. HTS's human rights record, indistinguishable from ISIS's, has already negated its capacity to organize civil resistance.

For Israel, this most advantageous scenario could be considered a divided Syria, with Turkey controlling Rojava and Israel controlling Damascus and the southern provinces. In this scenario, Tel Aviv —forced by geopolitics— seizes the role of patron of the "Kurdish resistance" that would erupt in the region annexed by Turkey and has a high potential to impact the Turkish mainland. At the same time, it creates a buffer zone between itself and Turkey by placing a new regime loyal to Damascus.

However, in the long term, a Syria divided along north-south lines could lead to larger-scale wars, just as happened with the partition of Poland in 1939.

• Mehmet Tatlı wrote: Will Syria become the 1939 Poland of the Middle East?

For Turkey, dividing Syria along spheres of influence is a complete disaster scenario . If Syria is effectively divided between Israel and Turkey, Ankara could completely lose control of both Damascus and Syria. Finding a solution to the new variant of the Kurdish problem (in which Israel is also a player) could become even more difficult.

It's no coincidence that the peace process is centered on discussions about Israel. The hasty launch of the peace process in Türkiye stems precisely from an effort to avoid incurring these costs and avoid being confined to the rising Israeli hegemony in the region. The reason this issue is being viewed above party lines, including the CHP, is the high cost of Israel's minority policies for all of Turkey.

PKK leaders' statement that "Öcalan chose Türkiye" should not be underestimated. The Kurdish movement recognizes that Israel could bring more costs than benefits. Indeed, Syrian Kurds have repeatedly requested that Türkiye develop a constructive and inclusive approach that includes them. Judging from the press, the SDF may even consider forming an alliance with Turkey. Whether Türkiye can boldly seize this historic opportunity will impact the future not only of the Kurdish issue but of the entire Middle East.

It will be recalled that when ISIS attacked Rojava in 2014, Syrian Kurds turned their attention to Türkiye and sought support. Türkiye's stance led to the US establishing itself in the region. Today, the rote and threatening language used as if all this chaos didn't exist is whet the appetite of Israel, which seeks to establish itself in the region. Türkiye may not be able to make this costly mistake a second time.

Under current circumstances, all forms of military tension are pitting Turkey and Israel against each other over minority policies in the region—whether Syrian Kurds take sides or not. Moreover, this time, their natural allies, the Arabs and Persians, are very dispersed. Türkiye's predicaments of poverty and authoritarianism are also weakening Ankara's position.

Despite this complex situation, Turkey stands at a critical juncture as it prepares to take action. Either Ankara will face the heavy and prolonged cost of escalating relations with Israel in Syria, using ethno-imperialist tactics, or it will go down in history as an actor who embraces the peacemaking hand extended by the Syrian Kurds, reassuring the peoples of the region, and building a front against new imperialist interventions.