Experts have revealed what will happen to gasoline prices this winter.

Sergey Pikin, Director of the Energy Development Fund, and Igor Yushkov, an expert at the Financial University and the National Energy Security Fund, spoke to MK about what's happening with gasoline and diesel fuel, whether anti-crisis measures have worked, and whether we should expect a new round of price increases.

— How do you assess the current situation in the fuel market? Is the crisis behind us, or are we merely seeing a temporary respite amid the seasonal decline in demand?

Pikin: "The driving season is drawing to a close now. We recently celebrated Motorist's Day—a symbolic milestone after which demand traditionally begins to decline. It won't be as high as it was in late August and early September. Therefore, supply and demand in the market have gradually balanced out. As a result, prices have begun to decline—primarily in the wholesale segment—and a noticeable downward trend is noticeable across the country."

Retail, of course, won't see such a rapid impact: it operates by its own rules. But the wholesale market, which the government has been focusing on all summer, is showing signs of stabilization. Although, of course, it's still not far from its historical highs.

Regarding what the Ministry of Energy calls "stabilization," this primarily refers to the availability of sufficient fuel reserves and the ability to deliver them on time. This means it's not so much about prices as the physical availability of the product. Prices are an important factor, but still secondary. There are other agencies that monitor this area, such as the Federal Antimonopoly Service. But the most important thing is that fuel is available and reaches consumers. This is what true stabilization is all about.

Yushkov: I agree, the situation has more or less stabilized precisely due to lower consumption. When we talk about gasoline, we're primarily talking about the civilian sector—passenger cars. Diesel, however, is used by cars, agricultural machinery, the military, and trucks. Therefore, a drop in gasoline consumption in winter is entirely natural. People simply drive less. This is typical for the entire Northern Hemisphere—Russia, Europe, the US, and China. Consequently, the world needs less oil in winter than in summer. Government measures also played a role. For example, Belarus increased its supply of petroleum products through the exchange, meaning supply has increased.

Oil refineries that underwent unscheduled maintenance after the August attacks are now gradually returning to operations and ramping up production. These maintenance periods typically take a month or two, and by the end of October, we were already seeing results. Physical shortages remain a risk, of course, but we haven't seen any serious shortages. The problems that did occur in some regions primarily affected independent gas stations. They couldn't buy fuel at high exchange prices and sell it at retail without losing money, either due to FAS restrictions or competition from large vertically integrated companies. Therefore, many simply temporarily stopped selling gasoline. Hence the picture: diesel available, gasoline absent. The situation is now noticeably improving, due to both reduced demand and increased supply.

— What, in your opinion, are the key reasons for the recent price hike and supply disruptions? Is this the result of internal factors, such as refinery maintenance and surge demand, or was external circumstances, such as sanctions, drone attacks, and export restrictions, more influential?

Pikin: "Problems began piling up back in May, when the government, remembering the situation of previous years, reintroduced export restrictions. In the summer—June and July—global oil prices were falling, but domestic prices barely responded. In August, everything came together: unscheduled refinery maintenance, increased seasonal demand, and logistical disruptions—and the market exploded. The peak occurred in late August and early September. That's when the discrepancy between production structure and actual demand became particularly acute: there was plenty of 92-octane gasoline, but a shortage of 95-octane gasoline. Nationally, price increases were comparable to inflation, but volatility was observed for certain fuel types, especially for 95-octane gasoline, while the situation for diesel remained more stable.

Regional problems were most noticeable in Primorsky Krai, Crimea, and a number of other territories—independent gas stations experienced difficulties with procurement. Logistics also played a role: there is an annual shortage of fuel transport vehicles. The problem is old and predictable, yet authorities seem to be surprised anew each year. So, in many ways, the disruptions are the result of systemic disorganization.

Yushkov: There are several reasons, but the key one is the reduction in damper payments. This system compensates oil companies for part of their taxes in order to keep domestic prices down. Since oil is cheaper in 2025 than in 2024 and the ruble has strengthened, the difference between external and domestic prices has narrowed, and payments have been reduced by approximately 50%. Something similar happened in 2023, when companies compensated for their losses by increasing exchange prices. This year, history repeated itself: that's why the record for 95-octane gasoline occurred in August. Furthermore, there was a rule: if the price of AI-92 increased by more than 10% in a month, payments were reset to zero, so it was 95-octane that was becoming more expensive. Now the government has "frozen" this rule and promised stable payments, but 92-octane gasoline still hit a new all-time high in October. Meanwhile, oil companies' costs have actually increased: sanctions have complicated equipment supplies, repairs have become longer and more expensive, and profitability is declining. Oil companies are often considered "fat cats," but in this case, rising prices are a consequence of real costs.

— The government introduced a number of anti-crisis measures: a ban on gasoline exports, restrictions on diesel, and orders for oil companies to supply the domestic market. Did these measures actually work, or were they more of a short-term effect?

Pikin: "These measures can be assessed differently—a lot depends on the level. In places where logistics are simpler, it's possible to respond more quickly, without waiting for decisions from Moscow. Of course, when a deputy prime minister personally distributes fuel tankers, it's a bit much, but back then, the situation was anti-crisis. The main thing is that the measures affected logistics, but the price containment in the summer was less successful than expected. The problem wasn't just with exports—the volumes were small—but also with independent gas stations not always being able to buy fuel on the exchange. Trading is limited, and even with increased mandatory sales, there's still a shortage of fuel."

Direct contracts are also challenging: vertically integrated companies primarily supply their own gas stations. Exchange trading remained somewhat unaffected by the anti-crisis measures. If additional steps had been taken back in June—for example, increasing exchange quotas, as proposed by the Federal Antimonopoly Service—the situation would have been more manageable.

Regarding diesel fuel, the measures were more preventative and generally justified. By the end of August, the market remained balanced: fuel was plentiful and prices were stable. But when prices began to rise, it became clear that immediate action was needed.

Yushkov: "At that time, a physical gasoline shortage did indeed manifest itself. But overall, Russia doesn't export much—around 10-15% of its production, and even less in the summer. It's different with diesel: almost half is exported, and limiting it is dangerous—storages quickly fill up, forcing refineries to shut down. After the ban, gasoline exports were partially restored, but the incoming volumes weren't enough to depress exchange prices. Refining capacity declined, fuel became scarce, and pressure on prices remained."

Since the beginning of the year, gasoline prices have risen by 10-11% at retail, exceeding inflation (around 8%). Diesel, on the other hand, has almost stayed within the inflation corridor. This situation has been repeated for the second year in a row: diesel prices are within the inflation range, while gasoline prices are higher. There is no formal limit, but the government is effectively trying to keep price increases close to inflation. So far, this has only been partially successful.

— The US has added Russia's largest oil and gas holdings to its sanctions list. How might this impact the domestic fuel market? Or is this more of a political signal than an economic blow?

Pikin: Firstly, these sanctions will only take effect at the end of November—they've only been announced so far. There's time to finalize all current contracts and agreements. Regarding the potential impact, it's worth considering that the diesel fuel export restrictions don't directly affect the producers themselves. The sanctions target the largest oil and gas companies, which primarily export crude oil, not finished petroleum products. Diesel supplies were typically handled by their subsidiaries or quasi-independent companies, not directly linked to these holdings.

Therefore, I don't expect a significant impact on the domestic market. Everything will depend on the further dynamics of external demand. If it declines, the government may adjust diesel export restrictions—perhaps bringing some traders back into the market or changing the conditions to prevent exports from ceasing completely.

Yushkov: I agree, these sanctions will likely not have a direct effect on the market. The main consequence is the need to complicate the intermediary chain so that end buyers do not interact directly with companies subject to restrictions. Simply put, oil or petroleum products will be sold through additional entities—formally independent intermediaries, as is already the case in many other industries. Over time, these companies may also be added to sanctions lists, after which new ones will emerge in their place. It's a never-ending process—a kind of sanctions race.

This is unlikely to impact exports. The bulk of Russian diesel fuel currently goes to countries that have been actively purchasing it since 2021 and remain key partners. At the same time, they have increased exports to Europe, claiming that they do not sell Russian fuel themselves—officially, it is processed or re-exported. The European Union is currently discussing a ban on the import of petroleum products produced from Russian oil abroad, but for now, this is only an initiative. Nevertheless, such measures could lead to so-called "paper losses": the assets of Russian holdings in several European countries will likely have to be sold at reduced prices.

If these assets were previously valued at, say, $10 billion, and now have to be sold for half a billion, companies will record losses on paper. In theory, this could prompt them to try to offset losses domestically. However, I believe Russian regulators will restrain such attempts. Antitrust authorities are already closely monitoring the market situation and are unlikely to allow external losses to be passed on to domestic prices.

— In terms of physical market support—capacity restoration, refinery repairs, logistics—how prepared is the industry for the winter? Will gasoline and diesel supply shortages in the regions end?

Pikin: "It's important to distinguish between the two levels of government—the federal and the regional. The regional level is primarily concerned with supplying specific areas: from local oil refineries to gas stations. And here we finally need to learn from the situation that has been repeating itself for the last two years. Simply remember these lessons and review everything in the spring—how logistics worked, how regional energy ministries responded to disruptions. Look at where mistakes were made and do things differently. This is the simplest, yet somehow the most difficult, solution."

At the federal level, the challenges are more ambitious: logistics, pipeline operations, and resource distribution between major regions. Railroads play a significant role here, as they carry a significant portion of fuel shipments. The problem is that there aren't always enough tank cars in the right places, even when fuel is available. This is a matter of planning and collaboration with Russian Railways, the Ministry of Transport, and the Ministry of Energy. But this problem is solvable—the homework simply needs to be done in advance, not in the fall, but in the spring.

— The head of the Central Bank recently noted that rising gasoline prices have become a factor in inflation. How do you assess the outlook for fuel prices? Is there potential for a decline, or should drivers get used to the current level?

Yushkov: Unfortunately, retail fuel prices almost never go down here—it's only a matter of growth rate. Everything is interconnected. Oil companies say, "We need to repair equipment, we buy it on credit, and the Central Bank's interest rate is high, which means loans are expensive. All this leads to higher production costs, and we are forced to factor these costs into the price of gasoline." As a result, inflation rises. The Central Bank, seeing inflation, doesn't lower the rate. It's a vicious circle. The same thing with taxes: they raise VAT because the budget lacks revenue. The treasury suffers because the economy is cooling. These are all parts of the same system. What can the government do to curb price increases? First and foremost, it should ensure the safety of refineries. Companies incur additional costs for unscheduled repairs and for dealing with the consequences of attacks or incidents. This directly impacts production costs.

Another question is where to get equipment for repairs? Imported supplies have been under sanctions for three years now. Yes, some equipment is manufactured in Russia, some is purchased in Asia or imported through parallel imports, but it's difficult to completely solve the problem. Therefore, the industry primarily looks to the government for protection and stability—that's precisely its responsibility.

Incidentally, this is precisely what Western sanctions are aimed at—not to stop oil exports, but to continually increase costs. Our task is to reduce these costs. The state must ensure the protection of infrastructure, and companies must find ways to optimize and reduce the cost of maintenance and repairs. Domestic production is growing, and more equipment is being produced than before, but systemic support is still needed.

"Is it possible to break this vicious circle? Inflation is rising, fuel is getting more expensive, and companies are forced to raise prices to cover costs..."

Pikin: "If you calculate how much oil companies overpay due to high interest rates on loans, you'll find that these expenses are even greater than the costs of unscheduled repairs. In other words, the main damage comes not from repairs, but from the cost of borrowing. Breaking this cycle can only be done through overall macroeconomic policy. Inflation expectations aren't driven by refinery repairs—they depend on government and regulatory policies."

If we believe that a high key rate is a way to contain inflation, that's one logic. However, if we see that inflation is being driven by non-monetary factors, then we need to look for other tools. But such decisions should be made at the federal level.

There's a third option—a radical one. If someone believes the oil industry is operating improperly, they could nationalize the industry and establish state price regulation. Then both responsibility and results would be entirely the state's. This is one option, but first we need to define a strategy: which path do we choose—market, regulated, or a combination of the two? This will determine our subsequent response and actions.

What systemic measures are needed to prevent similar crises from recurring? Is it possible to create a strategic fuel reserve, as some market participants propose, or does this run counter to market logic?

Yushkov: "Ensuring security isn't just an additional expense; it also involves protecting the fuel storage facilities themselves. Attacks on refineries have intensified since late summer, and the storage facilities have been under attack throughout this time. For example, in the south of the country, this has created a need for more fuel tankers: previously, fuel was delivered by rail directly to storage facilities, and from there, it was distributed to gas stations. When this link was disrupted, logistics became more complex, and the entire supply chain had to be restructured. Therefore, the key priorities now are, firstly, ensuring security, secondly, developing our own industry for refinery repairs, and thirdly, creating fuel storage mechanisms. Previously, this wasn't particularly necessary: ​​strategic reserves are typical for importing countries, while in Russia, oil fields effectively served as such reserves.

But today the situation has changed, and the issue of creating a strategic fuel reserve has truly become pressing. This would smooth out market fluctuations: traders or independent gas station chains could, for example, purchase gasoline in the winter, store it, and use it in the summer when demand is higher. The development of exchange-traded instruments, the emergence of futures and long-term contracts, would help companies lock in prices for future deliveries in advance.

A separate problem is panic demand. As soon as rumors of fuel shortages surface, independent gas stations begin buying up gasoline, and people fill up their cans "just in case." This only exacerbates the situation. Therefore, the development of exchange-traded instruments and the creation of reserve stocks should be part of a systemic set of measures to stabilize the market.

Пикин: — Создание стратегического запаса топлива — это, безусловно, задача государства. Независимые трейдеры вряд ли станут заниматься этим добровольно, если не будет обязательной программы. Значит, условный государственный резерв должен формировать такие запасы, исходя из понимания, что они могут потребоваться в критических ситуациях. Можно обратиться к опыту Китая: там государство не только активно закупает ресурсы, но и создаёт значительные стратегические запасы, которые многократно превышают их текущие потребности. Это делается на случай любых глобальных потрясений, чтобы не зависеть от внешней конъюнктуры.

В нашем случае подобный подход тоже возможен, но требует отдельного решения на федеральном уровне. Ранее предпринимались попытки создания альтернативных схем хранения, но бизнесу они оказались невыгодны — даже при участии государства. Поэтому, на мой взгляд, нужно именно прямое государственное решение: определить объемы, регионы и инфраструктуру, где такие запасы будут размещаться. Технически это вполне реализуемо, наработки есть. Главное — политическая воля и системное понимание, что топливная безопасность сегодня стала вопросом не только экономики, но и национальной устойчивости.