Whale Brothers: Why Meloni's centrism is one of the most disconcerting developments in Italian politics.

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Brothers of Italy or brothers of the Whale? In the soporific landscape of Italian politics, there has long been a significant and underappreciated phenomenon that embarrasses observers on both the left and the right alike, and which has transformed what years ago seemed like an oxymoron into a concrete element of party life. The two seemingly irreconcilable words that appeared before many yesterday's eyes during the Prime Minister's speech at the Rimini Meeting are these: the first is "centrism" and the second is "Meloni." And the combination of these two seemingly incompatible words explains some interesting phenomena in Italian politics.

Since coming to power, Meloni, as we have repeatedly noted, has been overwhelmed by reality, and the need to forge compromises not only between the parties in her coalition but also between past ambitions and present needs has led her to soften the edges of her political action. The containment centrism adopted by Meloni for many months, supported by a slant of caution in managing public finances and a political will not to become entangled in divisive reforms, has also produced unexpected results over the months, such as stable support for Meloni's party. And so, quietly, what appeared to be a defensive strategy has transformed into an offensive one. Does one have to choose a figure to represent Italy in Brussels? No doubt: make way for Raffaele Fitto's Christian Democrat credentials. Does one have to choose whether or not to bet on a divisive reform like the prime ministerial mandate and a politically less divisive reform like the justice system? No doubt about it: no trauma, and justice for life. Much of the credit for Meloni's centrism, an interesting oxymoron, has been tied to the politics of "no," and to a certain extent, this remains the case today.

Meloni isn't a centrist, but she became one, by force of circumstance, thanks to her very different nature from Salvini-style right-wing extremism and Schlein-style group extremism. For a long period, Meloni's movement toward the center was a byproduct, the result of others' movements, the result of her "non-existence" rather than her being. Recently, however, the phenomenon of Meloni's centrism has taken on different characteristics and features, slowly pushing her own party, Brothers of Italy, toward a period of the Brothers of the Whale (white, of course). In recent weeks, with a few billiard shots, Meloni first winked at a segment of the electorate abandoned by the left, or fleeing if you will, with the appointment of former CISL secretary Luigi Sbarra as undersecretary for the South, and the special relationship with the CISL. These were signs of Meloni's explicit intention to make some moves to try to broaden her own consensus, seeking to tap into the centrist community as well. And after Sbarra, another billiards shot, here's the outstretched hand to the autonomist world of the SVP, the South Tyrolean People's Party, with which some of the White Whale's great leaders built special relationships in the past: from Moro to Fanfani, via Forlani, Andreotti, and De Mita. Small stories, of course, which combine with a daily effort to divide as little as possible when governing, and to cultivate identity traits more with words, statements, and anti-workism, than with facts and decisive decisions. The centrism that Meloni previously endured, which she viewed as an indirect effect of the mistakes of others, has over time become, for the prime minister, an element to strive for, with which to try to give a future and a different dimension to that form of technocratic populism that has fascinated observers on both the right and left in Europe for months (it is no coincidence that for months, conservatives and right-wing parties across Europe, from the United Kingdom to France, have seen Meloni's right-wing, fiery internally, reassuring externally, as a model to aspire to).

Some say, and some hope, that Meloni's centrist stance could push FdI closer to the EPP, especially given that a major Italian party, to have any impact in Europe, needs to be part of a large European group, and the further it distances itself from the major groups, the more irrelevant it risks becoming. Some theorize this transition, like Raffaele Fitto, the European Commissioner. Some consider it inevitable, like Francesco Lollobrigida, the Minister of Agriculture. Some consider it a duty, like Meloni's vice president of the Friuli Venezia Giulia region, Mario Anzil, who, in this very newspaper, said a few days ago that he wanted "FdI towards the EPP."

But ultimately, that transition, which who knows when or if it will arrive, is a reality. And the unexpected phenomenon of Meloni's centrism—a phenomenon that magically doesn't overlap with Forza Italia's centrism, and which currently appears to be complementary—well explains why Brothers of Italy in Europe has become increasingly mainstream and increasingly in tune with the party of Ursula von der Leyen and Roberta Metsola, both of whom are closely linked to Meloni . Along with the EPP, in recent months, FdI has voted not only for the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, but also for many pro-European, and therefore centrist, measures. The rearmament plan. The implementation of the €50 billion support for Ukraine. The approval of conditionality mechanisms on the European Union budget. The approval of an assistance package of weapons and funds for Ukraine. Meloni's centrism, until recently, was a consequence of the mistakes of both her allies and her adversaries. Today, however, it appears to be a choice, if not a choice of sides, at least a choice of midfield, because Meloni's centrist shifts are often balanced by measures, announcements, and narratives that have nothing centrist about them (see the recent vote on the security package, constructed not with centrist common sense but with penal populism). However, alongside the ideological measures, there is a constant, meticulous pursuit of divisiveness through words, through narrative, but not through action. The transformation of stability into the central element of the government's narrative, as evidenced by the desire to make financial reliability a constant element of the government's identity, is the closest thing there is to the best Christian Democrat agenda of the past (at least in words, we are somewhere between De Gasperi's "democracy needs stability as a condition of freedom" and Giulio Andreotti's "Better to muddle through than kick the bucket." Brothers of Italy or Brothers of the Whale? Meloni's centrism has gone from being a political oxymoron to one of the most interesting innovations in Italian politics. The contradictions remain, and there are many, but the matryoshka formula is there.

It's political mimicry: a strong identity, institutional realism, with an ideological exterior and a pragmatic content within. Brothers of Italy, yes, White Whale, who knows.

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