Strategy Paper | Nuclear Weapons: Russia's Hand on the Nuclear Detonator

"When states are not in the same alliance or bloc, peace between them is based on the fear of war." This is what three high-ranking Russian political scientists and government advisors write in the foreword to a strategy paper in which they offer recommendations for their country's future security doctrine. Originally intended solely for internal use by the Russian government, the paper, which emerged from lengthy debates with considerably more experts, was subsequently published in an edited version by the Moscow publishing house "Junge Garde." The Potsdam-based Welttrends publishing house has now published it in German. Not because it shares the positions expressed therein, but rather so that one can "gain a more accurate picture of the state of the debate on nuclear deterrence in Russia." In a separate foreword, Welttrends speaks of a "sobering document of the radicalization of influential sections of the Russian elite in the wake of the war against Ukraine."

Enhanced nuclear deterrence (the authors prefer to speak of restraint, intimidation, or disenchantment) is the central theme of the document; it is understood as Russia's life insurance and forms the basis of all deliberations. The fact that this analysis is not merely the subject of closed-door discussions but was published in Moscow is a statement to the world, especially to the Western powers: Beware, we can do things very differently.

Three traumas become clear that have profoundly shaped the thinking of Russia's political class: the dissolution of the Soviet Union and NATO's massive eastward expansion after 1990; the NATO attacks on Yugoslavia in 1999; and the refusal of the West, especially the USA, to accept Russia as a global power on equal terms. Ultimately, all of this is attributed to the West's failure to take Russia seriously as a nuclear power. The "military clash in Ukraine," which "with the help of the West has developed into the most hostile state in the world toward Russia," is also said to be due to the West's "insufficient confidence in Russia's nuclear intimidation." This forced Moscow to "switch to a special military operation in February 2022." Moreover, it was only through the West's "clear instruction" to Ukraine to win on the battlefield that this "special military operation" of Russia transformed "into a regional war on a 2,000-kilometer front," which was of existential importance for Russia.

The authors have a clear idea of what the outcome of the war in Ukraine must be. First, "symbolic targets" such as Kyiv's government district and the command centers of the military and intelligence services must be attacked. It is "incomprehensible that television and other information centers of the Kyiv regime have not yet been destroyed." Ukrainian territory—with the exception of the western regions—should be controlled by the Russian armed forces. In addition to the parts of Ukraine that have been and are being annexed by Russia, a "New Ukraine" should be established in those regions of the country "that are not hostile to Russia"—as a "demilitarized agricultural buffer zone." The consciousness of the population in the annexed regions should be "recoded," "following the example of the re-education of the population in East Germany (in the GDR)." All of this is described as the "second part of the war," without which "the fruits of Russia's military victory would be devalued."

The paper explicitly regrets that internationally, "the fear of nuclear war ... has largely disappeared." This must be changed "in order to maintain international peace." To this end, the authors call for a lowering of "the doctrinal threshold for the use of nuclear weapons." So far, Russia's self-perception only permits this if its very existence as a state is threatened. Instead, it proposes using nuclear weapons even in the event of a "threat to the strategically important national interests of the Russian Federation and its population," which would entail a fairly broad margin of discretion. Warnings about the use of nuclear weapons "should be a one-off," and empty threats "should never be permitted," because: "Words must be followed by actions—that is the fundamental principle of intimidation."

In other words: It must be made clear to opponents "that Russia will not allow itself to 'put nuclear weapons in brackets.'" Putin's advisors see their country at war not only in Ukraine. "Europe's ruling circles" are already "preoccupied with political-moral and military-economic preparations for a major war with Russia," they write. This is another reason why the "civilizing function of nuclear intimidation" must be "refreshed" among the European leadership elites.

The publication is a statement to the West: Be careful, we can do things very differently.

While, on the one hand, it speaks of a cautious and deliberate policy of nuclear intimidation, on the other, drastic scenarios are envisioned. For example, it is "unlikely that the Germans would support supplying Kyiv with ever more long-range missiles if they knew that, suppose it were, the city of Frankfurt would be burned down—or at least could be—in response to the attacks on Belgorod." Elsewhere, it states that Germany—which the authors accuse of "black ingratitude"—"must be completely destroyed if it resorts to nuclear weapons."

The changes in the geopolitical constellation in recent decades, which Russia increasingly sees as a threat, are described in detail. The authors view NATO's constant eastward expansion, the "color revolutions" in former Soviet republics, and the loss of territories and markets as a "frontal assault on our country's geopolitical interests." At the same time, regional, nationalist-based claims to power are blatantly evident—for example, in the case of lost territories. It is argued that with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of former Soviet republics, Russia lost "the integrity of the country's historical core." Only after Russia "returned to its accustomed, millennia-old positions of 'armed Greater Russia'" did it revitalize itself spiritually, economically, and scientifically and technologically.

Moscow is attempting to counteract its loss of power by seeking new alliances, even resorting to massive arms exports. The authors speak of the "world majority countries" that "seek to free themselves from Western hegemony" and of whom Russia is viewed as the "militarily strategic leader." This includes so-called strategic partners such as China, India, and Pakistan (all nuclear powers), but also countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. And, in a narrower geographical sense, it is about a "strategic buffer" from which "the enemy" must be expelled, a "security belt along the borders of the Russian Federation, especially with the countries of the near abroad" – that is, the surrounding former Soviet republics.

This book provides both an illuminating and frightening insight into the thinking of Russia's political elite. It provides the ideological and theoretical foundation for the aggressive postures of Putin's confidant Dmitry Medvedev, for example. Last autumn, in light of British arms deliveries to Ukraine, Medvedev declared that it was time to "sink this damned island of Anglo-Saxon dogs immediately." Not everything has to happen as outlined in the book, but the considerations are there. This makes it clear how thin ice we are now treading on in terms of security policy, especially in light of calls for more nuclear weapons in Europe and Germany. The nuclear detonator, already within reach, is being brought even closer.

The book also contains some subtle points of contact for attempts at understanding. For example, when it is woven in here and there that nuclear weapons will hopefully never actually have to be used. That in an increasingly multipolar world, a multidimensional arms race must be prevented because no one can win. Western politicians and diplomats should also listen to these nuances, even if they are generally drowned out by the nuclear saber-rattling. How twisted and dangerous the thinking behind the logic of military threats is is demonstrated, for example, by the claim that a lower threshold for the use of nuclear weapons could prevent a further arms race. Or that – even more absurd – the fact that Russia and China possess nuclear weapons is "objectively one of the factors for maintaining friendly relations between the two countries in the long term."

Meanwhile, no one should believe that very similar threat scenarios don't exist in Washington and Brussels. What is urgently needed is not more weapons of destruction, but more dialogue, understanding, trust, arms control, and disarmament. This has happened before, at least in rudimentary form. It was called peaceful coexistence. Strategists on all sides should not only look forward, but also look back. A nuclear-weapon-free world must not be a chimera, as the authors call it in their study, but rather a goal seriously pursued by humanity. Under penalty of its own destruction.